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HABEAS CORPUS IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY: A 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW 
 
Brian R. Farrell

 
 
The right to a judicial determination of the legality of an individu-
al‟s detention, commonly known as the right to habeas corpus, is consi-
dered to be one of the most fundamental guarantees of personal liberty.  
By allowing an independent judge to review the basis of a person‟s de-
tention and order the detainee‟s release if the grounds are unlawful, ha-
beas corpus serves as a bulwark against arbitrary arrest, torture, and 
extrajudicial killings.
1
  This right, whose evolution was largely driven by 
historic struggles to impose limits on the power of the monarch, is today 
widely protected in domestic and international law.
2
 
                                                             
  J.D., University of Iowa College of Law (1998); LL.M., National University of 
Ireland, Galway (2002).  Brian Farrell is director of academic support at the University of 
Iowa College of Law, an adjunct lecturer in international studies at the University of 
Iowa, and a director of the Innocence Project of Iowa. 
1 In the United States federal system, the role of habeas corpus includes use as a 
postconviction remedy.   
2 See generally, Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to 
Habeas Corpus in International Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT‟L L. 
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Questions regarding the proper scope of habeas corpus have been 
brought into sharp focus in the past decade.  In the years since the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, hundreds of people have been detained 
by the United States government as part of its “war on terror” at loca-
tions such as the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and Bagram Air-
field in Afghanistan.
3
    Most of these detainees face indefinite detention 
and have neither been charged with a crime nor afforded prisoner of war 
status.    
Many Guantanamo Bay and Bagram detainees have sought to use 
habeas corpus proceedings to challenge the legality of their detention.  
The United States government initially took the position that habeas cor-
pus was not available to detainees because of their status as “enemy 
combatants” and their location outside of the sovereign territory of the 
United States.
4
  In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held in Rasul 
v. Bush
5
 that non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to 
file habeas corpus petitions in federal courts.  Congress subsequently 
made a political determination as to the appropriate scope of habeas cor-
pus and passed legislation that, in part, stripped federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to hear habeas corpus petitions brought by enemy combatants.
6
  The 
United States Supreme Court found this jurisdiction-stripping provision 
unconstitutional in its 2008 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush.
7
 
Despite these Supreme Court rulings as to Guantanamo Bay detai-
nees, the government also continues to resist access to habeas corpus for 
detainees in Afghanistan.  On April 2, 2009, the federal district court for 
the District of Columbia held that habeas corpus was available to non-
Afghan citizens detained at Bagram Airfield pursuant to the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                        
551 (2009). 
3 See Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area: Military Unsure What 
Follows Transfer to U.S. Base in Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at A1; Eric Schmitt, 
U.S. to Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at A1. 
4 Memorandum from Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, Dep. Asst. Att‟ys Gen., U.S. 
Dep‟t of Justice, to William Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‟t of Defense, Possible Habeas 
Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 1 (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter 
Memo of Dec. 28, 2001], available at 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/01.12.28.pdf. 
5 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
6 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2608-09 
(2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).    
7 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
76 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.1:9 2010] 
 
Court‟s Boumediene decision.
8
  Within days, the government moved for 
certification to appeal and for a stay of proceedings, both of which were 
granted.
9
  It argued, in part, that habeas corpus petitions would interfere 
with military operations and Executive Branch authority.
10
  
The question of whether detainees such as those at Bagram and 
Guantanamo Bay should have access to habeas corpus is a complex one.  
It involves issues of territorial jurisdiction, effective control, separation 
of powers, and the status of the individuals.  It implicates domestic statu-
tory law, case law, and constitutional law, as well as international huma-
nitarian law and, arguably, international and regional human rights law.   
However, at a more basic level, this question must be postured as an 
inquiry as to the nature of the right of habeas corpus and the applicability 
of the rule of law during national security emergencies.  At this level, the 
situation presented by detainees at Guantanamo Bay or Bagram is not en-
tirely unique.  It represents another example of those situations in which 
governments have attempted to deny the availability of habeas corpus 
based on real or perceived threats to national security. 
This article does not attempt to resolve the many legal questions 
surrounding availability of habeas corpus under American jurisprudence.  
Instead, it strives to provide perspective for the ongoing legal and politi-
cal debate by analyzing the nature of the right to habeas corpus by refer-
ence to the history of the right and through comparative examples.  The 
article begins with a look at the historical development of the right to ha-
beas corpus.  It then examines the role that habeas corpus has played dur-
ing emergency situations in several countries.  Finally, based on these 
illustrations, the article draws conclusions as to the nature of the right 
and the consequences of its suspension. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
The genesis of habeas corpus lies in the establishment of a central 
court system which was superimposed over England‟s existing local 
courts after the Norman Conquest in 1066.
11
  A procedure was needed to 
                                                             
8 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). 
9 Id. at 57-58. 
10 Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 44, 54-55, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-5265 (Cir. D.C. 2009). 
 
11 WILLIAM DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 (1980). 
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summon an individual before these central courts, and this was accom-
plished through the creation of a device commanding the sheriff to bring 
the party to the judge.  By the early thirteenth century this procedure was 
firmly established and was known as the writ of habeas corpus, the Latin 
for “you have the body.”
12
  Habeas corpus, the great bulwark of liberty, 
thus originated as an exercise of the crown‟s authority, and only issued at 
the court‟s prerogative. 
By the mid-fourteenth century, however, this was changing, primar-
ily as a result of judicial rivalry.  Cases from the time show that the writ 
of habeas corpus was being issued at the request of persons in jail who 
were awaiting civil trials in the lower courts.
13
  While the central courts‟ 
true motivation was often to divest the lower court of its jurisdiction and 
generate increased revenue for itself,
14
 two important transformations 
were occurring.  An individual could now initiate a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, and the courts were now using habeas corpus to examine the 
grounds for the individual‟s detention.  
By the time Parliament took actions to curb abuses in the central 
courts‟ use of habeas corpus,
15
 their supremacy over the older local 
courts had already been established.  The central, or superior, courts next 
began to use habeas corpus as a means of challenging each others‟ au-
thority.  In particular, the courts of common law used the writ to review 
the legality of imprisonment ordered by the ecclesiastical court, courts of 
admiralty, and chancery.
16
   
The reach of habeas corpus continued to extend and by the late six-
teenth century it was being used to inquire into detentions ordered by the 
king‟s Privy Council, an administrative body that exercised both judicial 
and executive functions.
17
  These inquiries might have had little imme-
                                                             
12 Id. at 15-17. 
13 Y.B. 14 Edw. 3, Trin. 1 (1340) (Eng.). 
14 DUKER, supra note 11, at 29. 
15 See, e.g., Statute of Leicester, 1414, 2 Hen. 5, c. 2, § 4 (Eng.); 1433, 11 Hen. 6, c. 
10 (Eng.); 1554, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13, § 7 (Eng.); 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 5, § 2 (Eng.). 
16 See, e.g., Y.B. 22 Edw. 4, Mich. 21 (1483) (Eng.); Thomlinson‟s Case, (1605) 77 
Eng. Rep. 1379 (K.B.); Glanville v. Courtney, (1610) 80 Eng. Rep. 1139 (K.B.); Addis‟ 
Case, (1610) 79 Eng. Rep. 190 (K.B.); Chancey‟s Case, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 1360 
(K.B.); King v. Dr. Gouge, (1615) 81 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B.); Hawkeridge‟s Case, (1617) 77 
Eng. Rep. 1404 (C.P.). 
17  DUKER, supra note 11, at 40. 
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diate importance, as the courts tended to give the Council great defe-
rence.
18
 Historically, however, they represented a watershed moment, as 
they marked the dawn of judicial scrutiny of detentions ordered by the 
executive. 
By the early seventeenth century, the judicial development of ha-
beas corpus was supplemented by Parliamentary concern about the au-
thority of the monarch.  In 1628, Parliament addressed executive deten-
tion by passing resolutions calling for habeas corpus to be available in all 
cases of detention, and for the release of any imprisoned person if no 
lawful grounds existed for the detention.
19
  As a compromise, the King 
accepted, in the so-called Petition of Right, the proposition that he could 
no longer imprison without showing cause.
20
  Although its legal force 
was initially questioned,
21
 this proposition came to be generally accepted 
with the passage of time.
22
  The role of habeas corpus in reviewing de-
tentions ordered by the king was slowly becoming established, through 
judicial development and later through legislative action. 
Even during the eleven year suspension of Parliament by King 
Charles I from 1629 to 1640, habeas corpus continued to be employed to 
review most executive orders of imprisonment.
23
  A notable exception 
was those detentions ordered by the Court of Star Chamber, a secretive 
political court renowned for its abuses of power,
24
 with which the com-
                                                             
18 See Hellyard‟s Case, (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.B.); Peter‟s Case, (1586) 74 
Eng. Rep. 628 (1586); Howel‟s Case, (1586) 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B.) (holding the com-
mittal valid after being informed the action had been taken by the entire Council); but see 
Search‟s Case, (1586) 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B.) (holding insufficient a return citing letters 
patent from the Queen as the basis for imprisonment). 
19 See Darnell‟s Case, 3 St. Tr. 1 (1627). 
20 R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 13-14 (1989). 
21 See Six Members‟ Case, 3 St. Tr. 235 (1629). 
22 SHARPE, supra note 20, at 14.  The Petition of Right is also responsible for the as-
sociation between habeas corpus and the Magna Carta.  As they sought to strengthen ha-
beas corpus, members of Parliament embraced the romantic notion that the Magna Carta 
was the source of the writ.  DUKER, supra note 11, at 45.  Most modern scholars now 
conclude that habeas corpus did not have its origins in the Magna Carta.  See J.C. HOLT, 
MAGNA CARTA 11 (1965); DUKER, supra note 11, at 45; Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: 
The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375, 377 (1998). 
23 See Chambers‟s Case, (1628) 79 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B.); Lawson‟s Case, (1638) 79 
Eng. Rep. 1038 (K.B.); Barkham‟s Case, (1638) 79 Eng. Rep. 1037 (K.B.); Freeman‟s 
Case, (1640) 79 Eng. Rep. 1096 (K.B.). 
24 See HAROLD POTTER, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS 
INSTITUTIONS 135-36 (1932); GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 258-59 (1955). 
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mon law courts were reluctant to interfere.
25
  The development of habeas 
corpus was no longer solely driven by the judiciary, though, and Parlia-
ment again strengthened the writ upon reconvening in 1640.  The Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1640 abolished the Star Chamber
26
 and provided that any 
person imprisoned by executive organs could seek review by the com-
mon law courts via habeas corpus.
27
  The Act set a time limit of three 
days for the court to act and imposed damages on judges who failed to 
comply.
28
 
The tension between king and Parliament grew, and in 1641 Parlia-
ment issued its list of complaints against the king known as the “Grand 
Remonstrance.”
29
  Among the charges leveled at the monarch were his 
disregard for the Petition or Right and his unjust imprisonment of sub-
jects.
30
  Civil war erupted in 1642 and Charles I was beheaded in 1649.
31
  
Despite the removal of the monarch, unlawful imprisonment continued, 
with courts often unwilling to act or intimidated into compliance by the 
new executive.
32
   
Attempts to evade the reach of habeas corpus were common follow-
ing the restoration of the monarchy.  Prisoners were transferred to Scot-
land or overseas in an effort to put them beyond the writ‟s scope, or were 
continually moved to thwart service on the right custodian.
33
  Increasing-
ly, Parliament intervened, going so far as to impeach the Lord High 
Chancellor for causing subject to be “imprisoned against law, in remote 
islands, garrisons, and other places, thereby to prevent them from the 
benefit of the law,” amongst other charges.
34
  Still, it could not close 
many loopholes that limited the effectiveness of habeas corpus despite 
                                                             
25 Chambers’s Case, 79 Eng. Rep. at 747. 
26 An Act for the Regulating the Privie Councell and for taking away the Court 
commonly called the Star Chamber, 1640, 16 Car., c. 10, § 1 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=47221. 
27 Id. § 6. 
28 Id. 
29 Grand Remonstrance (1641), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE 
PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625-1660, at 209-10 (Samuel Gardiner ed., 1906). 
30 Id. arts. 11-12, 14-15. 
31 GOLDWIN ALBERT SMITH, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 325, 339 (1949). 
32 See Streater‟s Case, 5 St. Tr. 366 (1653); Lilburne‟s Case, 5 St. Tr. 371 (1653); 
Cony‟s Case, 5 St. Tr. 935 (1655). 
33 SHARPE, supra note 20, at 18; DUKER, supra note 11, at 52-53. 
34 See Edward Earl of Clarendon‟s Trial, 6 St. Tr. 291 (1667).   
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repeated attempts.
35
 
Finally in 1679, Parliament passed comprehensive legislation en-
hancing habeas corpus.  The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 limited move-
ment of prisoners, prohibited imprisonment in Scotland, Ireland, the isl-
ands, and overseas, required judges to consider habeas corpus petitions in 
a timely manner, set time limits for the production and, if ordered, re-
lease of prisoners, and guaranteed speedy trials.
36
  The Act marked the 
full arrival of habeas corpus and firmly established its status as a check 
against the illegal deprivation of liberty by the State. 
Habeas corpus continued to develop in English law
37
 and was even-
tually exported to British colonies and beyond. The earliest constitutional 
guarantee of habeas corpus occurred in the United States in 1789.  Ar-
ticle I of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[t]he Privilege 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
38
  
The right to habeas corpus has spread worldwide in the past two 
centuries as a result of the influence of Anglo-American law and the in-
clusion of habeas corpus principles in post-World War II international 
and regional human rights instruments.
39
 Today, sixty-four national con-
stitutions contain an express right to habeas corpus.
40
  Four prohibit the 
suspension of habeas corpus.
41
  Another fifty contain both a guarantee of 
                                                             
35 Attempts to strengthen habeas corpus were made in 1668, 1669, 1673, 1675, 1676 
and 1677.  See DUKER, supra note 11, at 53-58; Helen Nutting, The Most Wholesome 
Law – The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 65 AM. HIST. REV. 527, 528-43 (1960).  In addi-
tion to loopholes leaving habeas corpus open to abuse, it was also uncertain whether writs 
of habeas corpus could be issued by courts out of their regular term.  See Jenkes‟ Case, 6 
St. Tr. 1190 (1676). 
36 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://british-
history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=47484. 
37  See Habeas Corpus Act 1816, 56 & 57 Geo. 3, c. 100 (Eng.) (allowing the court 
to examine the truth of facts set forth in a return and to hold proceedings to controvert the 
facts recited in the return); Habeas Corpus Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 20 (Eng.) (prohi-
biting issuance of writs from English courts into any colony with a competent court); 
Administration of Justice Act 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, §§ 14-15 (Eng.) (limiting repeat 
applications and providing procedure for appeals). 
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
39 For a discussion of the spread of habeas corpus from English law to diverse legal 
systems around the world, see generally Farrell, supra note 2, at 556-65. 
40 Id. at 564. 
41 Id. 
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liberty and a guarantee of judicial redress for violations of the right.
42
 
II. HABEAS CORPUS IN EMERGENCIES 
On March 1, 1689, a royal messenger appeared in the House of 
Commons to report that a number of persons in London had been ar-
rested for conspiring against the king.
43
  He warned that the conspirators 
could use habeas corpus as a means of securing their release and continu-
ing their plot.
44
  Despite opposition, Parliament followed the king‟s rec-
ommended plan of action. Less than a decade after the passage of the 
landmark Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the right to habeas corpus was 
suspended for the first time due to the existence of a state of emergen-
cy.
45
 
Since 1689, countries where the right to habeas corpus is guaranteed 
have experienced a variety of threats and other emergencies.  This sec-
tion will look at five examples to illustrate the role of habeas corpus in 
such emergencies.  It will examine the actions taken with regard to ha-
beas corpus access during emergency situations in India, Brazil, Israel, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
A. India and The Emergency 
The modern Indian legal system was largely based on the English 
model established during the colonial period.  The Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679 was incorporated into Indian law in the late nineteenth century.
46
 
Following independence in 1947, the right to habeas corpus was guaran-
teed in the Indian Constitution.
47
   
                                                             
42 Id. 
43 See ANCHITELL GREY, 9 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1689) 129-30, available at 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=40490.  
44 Id. 
45 An Act for Impowering His Majestie to Apprehend and Detaine such Persons as 
He shall finde Just Cause to Suspect are Conspireing against the Government, 1689, 1 W. 
& M., c. 7 (Eng.), available at http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=46293. 
46 The Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 5 of 1898; INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. 
(1967), v. 2, ch. XXXVII, § 491.  
47 See INDIA CONST. arts. 21, 32, 226. 
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The Emergency, which has been called “the darkest hour of India‟s 
history after Independence,”
48
 began following the June 12, 1975 convic-
tion of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by the Allahabad High Court for 
election misconduct.  Although Gandhi was ordered removed from her 
post, the judgment was stayed pending appeal.
49
  On June 25, 1975, In-
dia‟s president declared a state of emergency on the advice of the prime 
minister, citing national security concerns and an economic crisis.
50
  
Elections were postponed, civil liberties were curtailed, and the govern-
ment claimed extraordinary powers. 
Among the rights suspended by the proclamation was the right to li-
berty, found in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.  Many people were 
detained by police pursuant to the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 
and a number of them filed petitions for habeas corpus challenging their 
detention.  The government argued that habeas corpus was unavailable 
due to the suspension of Article 21.
51
  Nine of India‟s high courts re-
jected this argument, holding that even if the fundamental right to liberty 
was suspended, a detainee was entitled to a judicial determination that 
the order of detention complied with the law and was made in good 
faith.
52
 
The Indian Supreme Court reversed the high courts and held that no 
person had standing to even petition for habeas corpus in light of the 
presidential order declaring the emergency.
53
  Given the suspension of 
the right to liberty, it reasoned that a detainee could not even inquire as 
to which provision the detention was authorized under, or question 
whether the formalities of that provision had been complied with.  Essen-
tially, it held that not only was there no longer a right to liberty, but that 
no legal source was necessary to authorize detentions. 
The lone dissenting justice, H. R. Khanna, argued that even if Ar-
ticle 21 was suspended, it was a basic premise that the state could only 
perform an act – such as arresting an individual – if some authority for 
the act existed in the law.  He wrote:   
                                                             
48 H.M. SEERVAI, THE EMERGENCY, FUTURE SAFEGUARDS AND THE HABEAS CORPUS 
CASE: A CRITICISM 3 (1978). 
49 Id. at 4. 
50 Id. at vii.  
51 Id. at 8. 
52 Id. 
53 A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, 1976 A.I.R. 1207 (Del.) 1392.   
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The power of the courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus is regarded as one 
of the most important characteristics of democratic states under the rule of 
law.  The principle that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty with-
out the authority of law is rooted in the consideration that life and liberty 
are precious possessions.
54
 
A person was, therefore, entitled to find out what authority the govern-
ment was acting on, and to ensure the government complied with that au-
thority, even absent the right to be free. 
The Emergency ended in early 1977.  Facing public pressure, 
Gandhi called elections and was soundly defeated.  Before leaving office, 
she advised the president to withdraw the proclamation.
55
 
The 44th Amendment to the Indian Constitution subsequently made 
it impossible to suspend habeas corpus.
56
  As a result, in situations where 
the military and police have broad powers pursuant to emergency legisla-
tion – even including the right to shoot to kill based on mere suspicion 
that it is necessary to do so to maintain public order – habeas corpus has 
been singled out as the “only remedy available” for the protection of the 
individual.
57
 
B. Brazil’s Military Government 
In 1830 Brazil became the first Latin American county to guarantee 
the right to habeas corpus.  The habeas corpus provisions of Brazil‟s 
1830 Penal Code and 1832 Code of Criminal Procedure were based on 
British law.
58
  Habeas corpus eventually became a constitutional guaran-
tee, and its application to actions of the executive was established by the 
late nineteenth century.
59
 
In 1964, Brazil‟s military seized government power in a coup.  The 
                                                             
54 Id. (Khanna, J., dissenting). 
55 SEERVAI, supra note 48, at viii. 
56 Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Bill of 1978, § 40(a); BRIJ KISHORE 
SHARMA, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 56 (2005). 
57 SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL 
POWERS ACT: A STUDY IN NATIONAL SECURITY TYRRANY, § 4, available at: 
http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/armed_forces.htm.  
58 Phanor Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience, in 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASEBOOK 99 (Kenneth Karst & Keith 
Rosenn eds., 1975). 
59 Id. at 100. 
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legislature was rendered impotent while the new president, selected by 
the military, was given expanded powers.
60
  Political rivals and leftists 
were detained. 
Among those arrested was a university professor charged with pro-
moting violent subversion.  While detained, he filed a petition for habeas 
corpus.  Examining his case in 1964, the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Bra-
zil‟s highest constitutional court of appeal, found that the criminal case 
lacked just cause, and ordered his release.
61
  The court granted numerous 
other habeas corpus petitions in 1964 and 1965, including several filed 
by prominent political enemies of the military regime.
62
  When the mili-
tary regime attempted to try corruption and subversion cases before mili-
tary courts, the Supreme Federal Tribunal granted habeas corpus peti-
tions on the grounds that the charges were beyond the scope of military 
courts‟ jurisdiction under the National Security Law of 1953 and re-
moved the cases to civilian courts.
63
 
The military government attempted to pack the Supreme Federal 
Tribunal in 1965 by increasing its size from eleven to sixteen members.
64
  
It also increased the jurisdiction of military courts while restricting that 
of civilian courts.
65
  The exemption of certain government actions from 
judicial review was formalized in the 1967 constitution.
66
 
Though the Supreme Federal Tribunal was now “undeniably more 
favorably disposed toward the revolutionary government,” the courts 
were not reduced to a rubber stamp for the government.
67
  A district 
court ordered the release of a prominent journalist in 1967,
68
 and in 
                                                             
60 Martin Feinrider, Judicial Review and the Protection of Human Rights under Mili-
tary Governments in Brazil and Argentina, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‟L L. REV. 171, 177-78 
(1981). 
61 S.T.F., H.C. No. 40.910, Relator: Sergio Cidade de Rezende, 24.8.1964, 5 S.T.F.J. 
7 (Braz.), reprinted in English in Karst & Rosenn, supra note 58, at 210-13. 
62 Feinrider, supra note 60, at 178-79. 
63 Id. at 179. 
64 Karst & Rosenn, supra note 58, at 214.  Rosenn observes that, interestingly, the 
junta filled the new positions with respected judges, some of whom were critics of the 
government.  Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 785, 
813 (1974). 
65 Karst & Rosenn, supra note 58, at 214.   
66 Feinrider, supra note 60, at 180. 
67 Karst & Rosenn, supra note 58, at 214. 
68 J.F.-4, Relator: Helio Fernandes, 3.7.1967, 219 R.F. 385 (Brazil), cited in Feinrid-
er, supra note 60, at 180.  
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1968, the Supreme Federal Tribunal granted writs of habeas corpus to a 
former minister of the ousted government, a student union leader, and a 
group of students jailed for holding a forbidden meeting.
69
  Still, the 
court was reluctant to interfere in other politically sensitive cases.
70
 
In late 1968 the government implemented Institutional Act No. 5, 
which “removed virtually all institutional restraints on the executive‟s 
exercise of power.”
71
  Habeas corpus was suspended in all cases of 
crimes against national security, the social order, and the economy.
72
  
The Supreme Federal Tribunal was purged and the court‟s president re-
signed in protest.
73
  In early 1969, the military government promulgated 
Institutional Act No. 6, which altered the composition of the court, li-
mited its appellate jurisdiction, and completely eliminated its jurisdiction 
to hear review national security cases that had been tried before military 
tribunals.
74
  While the latter restriction was removed in 1969, and the 
courts did continue to entertain habeas corpus petitions, Institutional Acts 
No. 5 and 6 essentially signaled that the government would no longer at-
tempt to exercise control through the judicial system, but would instead 
act outside of it.     
C. Israel and the Occupied Territories 
The territory of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, was administered 
by the United Kingdom as a League of Nations mandate following the 
Ottoman defeat in World War I.
75
  Upon achieving independence in 
1948, Israel incorporated most elements of the British legal system.  The 
Israeli judiciary, particularly its Supreme Court, is highly regarded at 
home and abroad.
76
  
Since 1948, a state of emergency has existed in Israel.  It has fought 
                                                             
69 Karst & Rosenn, supra note 58, at 214. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 214-15. 
72 Id. at 215. 
73 Feinrider, supra note 60, at 184. 
74 Karst & Rosenn, supra note 58, at 215. 
75 Emma Playfair, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TWO DECADES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK 
AND GAZA STRIP 1, 5 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). 
76 See Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 19 
YALE J. INT‟L L. 1, 22 (1994). 
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several active wars during that time and has formally been at war with 
one or more of its neighbors throughout its existence.  Israel has suffered 
frequent attacks inside its borders from terrorist organizations which, in 
the words of the Israeli Supreme Court, “have set Israel‟s annihilation as 
their goal.”
77
  Israeli forces have occupied the West Bank and Gaza since 
its victory in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.
78
  A military government 
administers the territories, with legislative powers held by the military 
commander and judicial power exercised by military courts.
79
  The Israe-
li Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review actions of the military gov-
ernment.
80
 
 Israeli law and military regulations provide for arrest in the crimi-
nal context, and also for administrative detention, which is often used in 
the anti-terrorism context in both Israel and the occupied territories.
81
  In 
2002, the Israeli Knesset passed the controversial Incarceration of Un-
lawful Combatants Law authorizing the detention of “enemy comba-
tants” whose release would harm state security, even if that individual 
does not pose any actual security threat.
82
  In all of these situations, the 
detainee is entitled to a review of the lawfulness of his detention by an 
independent judicial officer.
83
  Both within Israel or the occupied territo-
ries, a detention order upheld at the first judicial review may be appealed 
                                                             
77 HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 
817, ¶ 1. 
78 See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 4 (2002). 
79 See generally Brian Farrell, Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses as a Puni-
tive Measure: Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 28 BROOK. J. INT‟L L. 
871, 872-84 (2003). 
80 See HCJ 302/72 Khelou v. Government of Israel [1972], 27(2) 169, 176, summa-
rized in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975). 
81 See Brief of Amici Curiae Specialists in Israeli Military Law and Constitutional 
Law in Support of Petitioners at 8-14, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) [he-
reinafter Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
82  Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, (2002) (Isr.), reprinted 
in 32 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 389 (2002).  The law would, for example, authorize the contin-
ued detention of a person for purposes of a prisoner exchange even though the person 
himself did not pose a security threat. 
83 In the occupied territories, reviews are conducted by military judges.  While the 
Israeli Supreme Court has found military judges to be “independent of the investigators 
and prosecutors,” HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2003] 
IsrSC 57(2) 349, ¶ 35 [hereinafter Marab, 57(2)], concerns have been raised that military 
judges cannot be sufficiently independent to provide meaningful review.   
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to a court of appeals and, eventually, to the Israeli Supreme Court.
84
 
Criminal suspects in Israel are entitled to judicial review within 
twenty-four hours, and for administrative detainees the period is forty-
eight hours.
85
  In the occupied territories, judicial review of both criminal 
and administrative detentions must occur within eight days.
86
  Orders of 
detention for enemy combatants pursuant to the 2002 law must be re-
viewed by a civilian district court within 14 days.
87
  
Israeli courts have generally rejected the argument that practical ob-
stacles prevent such review.  For example, during a major military opera-
tion in the West Bank in 2002, the Israeli Defense Forces, finding it dif-
ficult to process the reviews of approximately 1,600 detainees, extended 
the period for review from eight to eighteen days.
88
  The Israeli Supreme 
Court held that the eighteen-day period was excessive, notwithstanding 
the existence of combat conditions.
89
  While conceding that detentions 
during combat are different than an arrest by police, and that it could not 
expect judges to accompany combat forces, the court held that judicial 
review of detention could wait only until detainees are removed from the 
battlefield to a location where review could be carried out.
90
  Moreover, 
the judicial review of detention has been granted even if the detention 
occurs outside of Israel or the occupied territories.
91
 
D. Martial Law and Emergencies in the United Kingdom 
The outright suspension of habeas corpus, an action reserved for 
Parliament, has been a rare occurrence in the United Kingdom.  The 
threat presented by James II led to another suspension of habeas corpus 
in 1696, seven years after the first.
92
  In the eighteenth century, Parlia-
                                                             
84 STATE OF ISR., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN RELATIONS & INT‟L ORG. DEP‟T, 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AS A MEANS OF 
COMBATING TERRORISM 4 (Mar. 2003). 
85 See Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Detention) Law, 5756-1996, § 
29(a) (1996) (Isr.); Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, S.H. 76, § 2(c). 
86 Marab, 57(2), ¶¶ 5, 29, 36. 
87 Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, § 5(a). 
88  Marab, 57(2), ¶ 28.   
89 Id.  ¶ 36. 
90 Id.  ¶ 30. 
91 See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 81, at 7. 
92 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 11 (Eng.). 
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ment suspended habeas corpus due to the fear of invasion from France,
93
 
the threat of rebellion in Scotland,
94
 and the revolution in the American 
colonies.
95
 During World War II, Parliament suspended Article 8 of the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 to allow the detention of British subjects on 
the Isle of Man.
96
   
In situations where habeas corpus has not been suspended, the de-
termination of the legality of a person‟s detention may nonetheless be 
impacted by a declaration of martial law or emergency.  During the Boer 
War, Britain declared martial law in South Africa.
97
  During that conflict, 
British courts continued to issue writs of habeas corpus but made no fur-
ther inquiry if the return established that martial law exists and the peti-
tioner was detained in a martial law area.
98
  In essence, the existence of 
martial law served as a sufficient basis for the detention. 
During World War I, the Home Secretary was given complete dis-
cretion to detain persons of “hostile origin or association” without trial.
99
  
Rejecting the claim that this amounted to a suspension of habeas corpus, 
Lord Atkinson found that the subject “retains every right” conferred by 
the habeas corpus statutes.
100
  The writ of habeas corpus could still issue 
to the custodian, he reasoned; all the regulation had done was temporari-
ly make detention without trial lawful under certain circumstances.
101
   
At the onset of World War II, a regulation was promulgated provid-
ing, in part: 
If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of 
hostile origin or associations, or to have been recently concerned in acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm, or in the prepa-
ration or instigation of such acts, and that by reason thereof it is necessary 
to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person di-
                                                             
93 1744, 17 Geo. 2, c. 6 (Eng.). 
94 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 1 (Eng.). 
95 1777, 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (Eng.). 
96 See Isle of Man (Detention) Act, 1941, 5 & 6 Geo. 6, c. 16 (repealed 1947) (Eng.). 
97 See DAVID CLARK & GERARD MCCOY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 64-68 
(2000). 
98 Marais v. Gen. Officer & AG, [1902] A.C. 109, 114-15 (P.C.) (appeal from S. 
Afr.) (U.K.); R v. Becker, R v. Naude 1900 (17) S.C. 340, 343-44 (Cape S.C.). 
99 Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1915, Stat. R. & O. 551, 14B 
(promulgated pursuant to Defense of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, 
c. 29, s. 1) (U.K.). 
100 R v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260, 272 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
101 Id.  
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recting that he be detained.
102
 
The regulation further provided that a “person detained in pursuance of 
this regulation shall be deemed to be in lawful custody . . . .”
103
   
The question for courts in ensuing habeas corpus challenges was 
whether to apply an objective or subjective standard in reviewing wheth-
er a detainee presented a security threat.  The House of Lords concluded 
that it should “presume that the Secretary of State, acting under a regula-
tion having the force of law, had what he considered reasonable cause for 
his belief.”
104
  Thus, habeas corpus was not available where the Secre-
tary indicated that he was satisfied his belief was reasonable.
105
 
E. Wartime Suspensions in the United States 
The right of habeas corpus has been suspended during wartime in 
the United States on several occasions.  Two situations which were ex-
amined by the federal courts provide insight into the constitutionality of 
the suspension of habeas corpus.   
Within weeks of the beginning of the American Civil War in April 
1861, President Abraham Lincoln issued orders to his military com-
manders authorizing them to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
106
  Later 
that year, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, sitting as 
justice of the federal Circuit Court of Appeals for Maryland held that the 
power to suspend habeas corpus was vested in Congress and, therefore, 
the president lacked the authority to suspend.
107
  The court acknowl-
                                                             
102 Defense (General) Regulations, 1939, Stat. R. & O. 1681, 18B(1) (promulgated 
pursuant to Emergency Powers (Defense) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62, s. 1) (U.K.). 
103 Id. at 18B(8). 
104 Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1942] A.C. 284, 295 (H.L.) (ap-
peal taken from Eng.). 
105 See generally id.; Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (considering Regulation 18B in a false imprisonment case). The Liversidge 
“no review of subjective satisfaction” doctrine was followed during and after the war in 
Australia, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, India, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Gha-
na, Nigeria, Cyprus, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.  CLARK & MCCOY, supra note 
97, at 113-14.  While British courts have turned away from the rule in most situations, it 
has yet to be repudiated in national security cases.  Id. at 113-22. 
106 Habeas corpus was suspended in Maryland and Florida in late April and early 
May, 1861.  16 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 16-18 
(James Richardson ed. 1896). 
107 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).  
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edged its inability to compel either the military or the president to comp-
ly with its order, but reminded the chief executive “of his constitutional 
obligation to „take care that the laws be faithfully executed.‟”
108
   
Undeterred, Lincoln continued issuing suspension orders throughout 
the first two years of the war.
109
  Only in March 1863 did the potential 
constitutional crisis pass when Congress enacted a law expressly autho-
rizing the president to suspend habeas corpus “whenever in his judgment 
the public safety may require it” in any part of the country.
110
 
Following the Pearl Harbor attack marking the American entry into 
World War II, habeas corpus was suspended in the Territory of Hawaii.   
In the law establishing the territory, Congress had empowered the terri-
torial governor to: 
In case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the pub-
lic safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or 
place the Territory or any part thereof, under martial law until communica-
tion can be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.
111
   
On December 7, 1941, the governor placed the territory under martial 
law and suspended habeas corpus.
112
  The president subsequently ap-
proved the action.
113
   
In April 1944, before any executive action had been taken proclaim-
ing an end to     martial law or restoring habeas corpus, an individual 
convicted of assault by a military court two months earlier petitioned the 
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii for a writ of ha-
beas corpus.
114
  The court sustained the writ, held that martial law did 
not exist despite the executive proclamation, and discharged the petition-
er.
115
  The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court‟s rul-
                                                             
108 Id. at 153. 
109 DUKER, supra note 11, at 167-68 n.110. 
110 12 Stat. 755 (1863). Following the war, Congress passed a law allowing suspen-
sion of habeas corpus by presidential proclamation in areas where the threat of rebellion 
existed. An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
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7, 17 Stat. 951-54 (1871). 
111 Hawaii Organic Act of 1900 § 67, 48 U.S.C. § 771 (1940). 
112 Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 
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114 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1945). 
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ing that martial law did not exist when there was no immediate threat of 
invasion and the civilian courts were open.  It did not, however, decide 
whether the continued suspension of habeas corpus was lawful since ha-
beas corpus had been restored before the case reached the court.
 116
 
III. THE MEANING AND ROLE OF HABEAS CORPUS 
In January 2007, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez testified 
before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee that “there is no 
expressed grant of habeas in the Constitution.” 117  He went on to 
point out that “the Constitution doesn‟t say every individual in the 
United States or every citizen is hereby granted or assured the right to 
habeas.”
118
  Gonzalez‟s statement sparked controversy, with lawyers and 
scholars weighing in on the constitutional status of habeas corpus in the 
United States.  
The debate over habeas corpus at Guantanamo Bay focused on the 
status of detainees, the degree to which they deserved protection from the 
risk of arbitrary detention, the government‟s need to interrogate or inca-
pacitate individuals it considered dangerous, and the scope of the appli-
cable habeas corpus statutes.  Rightly, the liberty interests of the individ-
ual detainees and the interests of the United States in successfully 
prosecuting the war on terror remain at the forefront of the discussion as 
the administration, Congress, the courts, and the public turn their atten-
tion to Bagram Airfield.   
Perhaps, though, these questions about the availability of habeas 
corpus at a particular location, to a particular detainee, or during a partic-
ular time in a nation‟s history can cause us to lose sight of the greater 
significance of habeas corpus as a barometer for the legitimacy of gov-
ernment and the existence of the rule of law.  The lessons of history and 
the experiences of other nations may be useful in illustrating this deeper 
meaning of habeas corpus.  This section will attempt to extract some 
general principles about habeas corpus from the previous two sections. 
Habeas corpus protects the individual, and it is usually considered 
                                                             
116 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 313 n.5. 
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in relationship to the individual.  The history of the writ‟s development, 
however, suggests that there is another, equally important relationship at 
issue – that between the executive and the legal order.  Habeas corpus 
originated, after all, not as a protection for the individual, but as a proce-
dure for the judiciary to issue a command to the executive in the person 
of the sheriff.   As habeas corpus evolved into a process to examine the 
basis of a person‟s detention, the real target of the writ was not the detai-
nee, but the government officer called on to justify the basis of his or her 
authority to detain. 
By the seventeenth century, Parliament, motivated by its desire to 
place limits on the authority of the king, took steps to strengthen the ju-
dicially-developed writ of habeas corpus.  It issued the Petition of Right 
and passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, which expressly allowed an-
yone imprisoned by the king or his agents to file a habeas corpus peti-
tion.
119
  The seeds of separation of powers and checks and balances were 
sown as the legislature endorsed judicial review of executive actions.   
The full arrival of habeas corpus occurred at the end of the century.  
The significance of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was not simply the 
protections it gave for individuals.  Its enactment marked a major miles-
tone, perhaps only matched by the signing of the Magna Carta, in the 
submission of the king to the rule of law.   
The export of habeas corpus around the world and its adoption by 
diverse legal systems, particularly democracies, has only enhanced this 
connection to the rule of law.  In many ways, habeas corpus serves as a 
barometer for the existence of respect for the rule of law and, by exten-
sion, the legitimacy of a government‟s authority.  The five situations out-
lined above serve to show how this relationship has played out in a varie-
ty of contexts. 
The 1975 Jabalpur judgment of the Indian Supreme Court
120
 was 
roundly criticized at the time it was issued and in the intervening 
years.
121
  Of course, the absence of habeas corpus relief was decried as 
an injustice to those detained.  More than that, though, the denial of ha-
beas corpus called into question the basic legitimacy of Prime Minister 
Gandhi‟s authority to govern.  Essentially, the judgment conceded that 
                                                             
119 See supra text accompanying notes 19-28. 
120 A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207, 1392. 
121 See, e.g., Fading Hope in India, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1976, at 21; SHARMA, su-
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HABEAS CORPUS IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY: A HISTORICAL AND 
COMPARATIVE VIEW                                                                          93 
 
the government would not even attempt to comply with the low legal 
thresholds it had itself established. 
The ruling cast doubts upon the strength of India‟s democratic sys-
tem.  A contemporary editorial in the New York Times suggested that 
“[t]he submission of an independent judiciary to absolutist government is 
virtually the last step in the destruction of a democratic society; and the 
Indian Supreme Court‟s decision appears close to utter surrender.”
122
  
The legitimacy of Gandhi‟s government was, in fact, undermined, and 
her party suffered a historic defeat after being pressured to call elections 
in 1977. 
In Brazil, habeas corpus existed in a meaningful way in the late 
1960s despite the fact that a military government held power.  In Brazili-
an tradition, the junta sought to demonstrate that its exercised legitimate 
authority despite the absence of a democratic mandate.  The military 
government initially operated within the established legal system and 
generally respected decisions of the courts, even unfavorable ones.  
Eventually, though, the government found the judiciary to be an ob-
stacle to its agenda.  The intention of the military leaders to simply cir-
cumvent the courts was signaled by the imposition of severe limitations 
on the Supreme Federal Tribunal‟s habeas corpus jurisdiction.  The mili-
tary government‟s decision to excuse itself from accountability via ha-
beas corpus corresponded with the evaporation of the last pretenses that 
it was exercising legitimate authority. 
A stark contrast is presented by Israel‟s guarantee of judicial review 
for all persons detained by the state “regardless of nationality or the cir-
cumstances of their seizure.”
123
  Israel demonstrates that alleged practic-
al obstacles to review of detentions are not truly an impediment, even in 
challenging circumstances.  It maintains a detention review regime in 
spite of a declared emergency, and even during actual combat and out-
side of its territorial jurisdiction.   
The refusal to suspend judicial review contributes immensely to the 
perceived legitimacy of Israel‟s security operations, even when other as-
pects of those operations are frequently criticized.  This demonstrates the 
legitimizing power of judicial review of detention and adherence to the 
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rule of law, even in situations where the “life of the state” might other-
wise present a convenient excuse to take the opposite path.  This is re-
flected in the Israeli Supreme Court‟s statement that “there is no more 
potent weapon than the rule of law.”
124
   
Historically, the United Kingdom and United States have abided by 
this principle, with the formal suspension of habeas corpus only occur-
ring on a geographically limited basis during wartime when the life of 
the nation arguably was implicated.  In the United Kingdom, the only re-
cent suspension occurred during World War II, when the country truly 
faced a mortal threat to its existence.  Even then, the suspension was li-
mited to the detention of Britons on the Isle of Man.     
In the United States, the unilateral suspension of habeas corpus by 
the executive during the Civil War nearly precipitated a constitutional 
crisis.  A century and a half later it remains as a black mark on the record 
of one of the nation‟s most highly regarded leaders.  This incident, it 
must be remembered, occurred against the backdrop of a war that was 
the bloodiest in the country‟s history and occurred on American soil.  
The suspension of habeas corpus in Hawaii followed the Pearl Harbor 
attack at a time when the threat of invasion was real.  In both situations 
suspension corresponded with the existence of or immediate threat of 
“rebellion or invasion” as required by the constitution.
125
 
  The formal suspension of habeas corpus in the United States sug-
gests that the rule of law and democratic order are being temporarily sa-
crificed in order to preserve the existence of the state.  Such situations 
have been extremely rare.  Perhaps it is telling that, even when it its sus-
pended, habeas corpus has been the means by which the very constitutio-
nality of its suspension has been challenged.
126
  
Some argue that the British emergency detention legislation during 
the World Wars was tantamount to a suspension of habeas corpus.  By 
granting the executive broad – even unlimited – authority to detain, the 
“legality of detention” portion of a habeas corpus inquiry is circum-
scribed.  Even in these situations, though, habeas corpus arguably plays a 
role in the maintenance of the rule of law.  There is, after all, a difference 
– albeit delicate – between the absence of any need to demonstrate legal 
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authority for detention and a legitimate grant of authority to detain, even 
if that encompasses broad, subjective grounds.   
The latter acknowledges that government agents cannot detain 
without some legal authority.  This provides the justification for the ar-
gument that habeas corpus should have been available in the Indian case, 
even in the absence of a right to liberty.  By analogy, even though there 
is no right to be free from taxes, the executive may not simply collect 
money from some citizens without any authorization.  Instead, the execu-
tive action of collecting taxes is based on some grant of authority.   
Habeas corpus requires a demonstration of the source of that author-
ity.  Presupposing the existence of an independent judiciary, this pro-
vides an opportunity for a judicial review of the source of that authori-
ty.
127
  In the British World War cases, the courts had the opportunity to 
scrutinize the very broad grant of authority to detain given to the execu-
tive by the legislature.  Though some may disagree with Parliament‟s de-
cision to grant this authority, or the courts‟ determination that it was va-
lid, the availability of habeas corpus confirmed that the authority existed. 
Importantly, habeas corpus provides an opportunity for the courts, in-
cluding a state‟s highest court, to ascertain whether the authority to de-
tain comports with basic constitutional rights or – increasingly – interna-
tional or regional human rights instruments. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This discussion is not meant to overlook the importance of habeas 
corpus to an individual detainee.  To the contrary, in most systems ha-
beas corpus remains the single most potent weapon in vindicating per-
sonal liberty.  This discussion is, however, meant to suggest that habeas 
corpus has a much greater meaning than its impact on an individual ba-
sis.  Perhaps more than any other legal concept, habeas corpus represents 
the acknowledgement that the executive is subject to the rule of law.  As 
such, habeas corpus may also very well be the canary in the mine for the 
abrogation of the rule of law and the erosion of government legitimacy. 
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